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Abstract 
Recent policies for English technical and vocational education, centred on 
apprenticeship reforms and the Sainsbury Review, have prioritised employer-led 
curricula and learning in employment settings. These policies are represented in 
policy discourse as radical changes that imitate successful European systems, 
raising new issues about the possibilities and limitations of policy learning and 
policy borrowing. Useful insights are offered by comparative political economy, 
which has located skill formation within networks of complementary institutions 
that shape economic life, rendering problematic the notion of change in a single 
dimension such as skills. Relatedly, historical institutionalism explains skill 
formation both as an enduring institution but also as the product of specific 
historical conflicts over workplace training. Building on these theoretical 
conceptions, a series of qualitative case studies carried out at key points in the 
emergence of current skills policies is reviewed, which demonstrates how wider 
conflicts are reflected in a tension between selectivity and inclusion currently 
playing out in the implementation English skills policy. The findings indicate the 
possibility of further stratification in post-16 education, through the process that 
historical institutionalism describes as ‘layering’. However, possibilities for a 
more coherent relationship between educational practice and the workplace may 
also be derived from this analysis.  
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Introduction: post-16 reforms in England and their international context 
Ongoing changes to technical and vocational education in England have reframed 
apprenticeships as employment-based credentials, whilst seeking to locate a significant 
period of full-time education in the workplace. These changes centre on the introduction 
of apprenticeship standards (Richard 2012; UK Government 2015) and the qualification 
and curriculum reform for full-time studies proposed by the Sainsbury Review 
(Independent Panel on Technical Education 2016). They are widely represented as a 
fundamental shift from earlier vocational education policies and a move towards the 
practices of the UK’s continental competitors. The Sainsbury Review announced its 
superiority over all previous reforms precisely in these terms:  
These have all been unsuccessful because they tinkered with technical education, 
and failed to learn from the successful systems in other countries (Independent 
Panel on Technical Education 2016, 6). 
The fundamental nature of these changes is denoted by the revived terminology of 
‘technical education’, which ‘is not, and must not be allowed to become, simply 
“vocational education” rebadged’ (23), and supported by such references to competitors 
as the Review’s illustrative vignettes of Danish, German, Dutch, Norwegian and 
Singaporean systems (88-101). The Richard Review of apprenticeships (Richard 2012), 
which led to the replacement of qualifications-based apprenticeship frameworks by 
‘employer-led’ standards, drew more cautiously on international models, pointing to 
these mainly in its recommendations for employer-designed qualifications and rigorous 
assessment. But it demanded equally fundamental changes, describing earlier 
apprenticeships as a ‘government-led training programme, shaped by training 
professionals not employers’ (4).  
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These developments have made slow progress. After the Richard Review 
(Richard 2012) required the existing qualification-based apprenticeship frameworks to 
be replaced by ‘standards’ that would represent employers more directly, ‘Trailblazer 
Groups’ were charged with producing the standards and the Institute for 
Apprenticeships (IfA) with approving their proposals and ‘end-point’ assessments 
(EPA), a process still continuing five years after the review was first published (Ofqual 
2017). For full-time students, the Sainsbury Review (Independent Panel for Technical 
Education 2016) resurrected the term ‘technical education’, little used since further 
education colleges developed broader missions in the 1970s and 1980s. New 
qualifications reflecting the needs of employers were to be designed by ‘T-level’ panels. 
(This term for upper-secondary qualifications is a reference to the ‘A’ levels taken by 
students on general education pathways, denoted as ‘academic’ by the Review.) The 
most immediately identifiable difference between these and earlier qualifications was 
the addition of substantial work placements of up to three months in duration. 
Following extensive placement trials, discussed below, the introduction of T-levels has 
been confined to three qualifications to be taught from September 2020. Proposals to 
develop tertiary provision that articulates more directly with these changes were 
included in the Sainsbury Review but have also been slow to emerge. 
This rate of change suggests that the difficulty of the task is greater than the 
original policy proposals suggested. Those ambitious declarations suggested that, whilst 
the past was to be set entirely aside, the desirable features of rival national systems 
could be selectively adopted, in the manner that UK food purveyors offer various 
‘continental selections’ to consumers. However, the distinctiveness of vocational 
education systems even within north-western Europe suggests that homogenisation is 
far from being accomplished, despite longstanding discussion of a common European 
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model (Petrini 2004). Greinert (2005) distinguished between the liberal ‘market model’ 
of the UK, where vocational skills are determined by their use in the market; the 
‘school-based’ model of France, delivered by state agencies and less dependent on 
workplace application; and the ‘dual corporatist’ model of Germany, largely determined 
‘by the employer, or organisations representing the interests of groups of employers’ 
(15). These national systems have certainly experienced shifts in recent years, including 
aspirations to relocate learning from school-led systems to the workplace (Gehin 2007; 
Grytnes et al. 2018). But this does not guarantee their transferability to new 
jurisdictions, as evidenced by critique of the ‘myths and brands’ promoted in the 
developing world (Heikkinen and Lassnigg 2015).  Greinert (2005) associated these 
models with patterns of development traceable back to the nineteenth century, implying 
that the distinctiveness of national systems owed much to the very history that reformers 
propose to put aside.  
This paper seeks to move these discussions beyond the sphere of education 
policy debate and to discover more general patterns and explanations of shifts in 
technical and vocational education policy. A more generalised approach is offered by 
political scientists who have taken a broader interest in skill formation, drawing on 
varieties of institutional theory. Several influential scholars in this field regard skill 
formation as central to the differences among nations and their policy choices: these 
perspectives have provided important insights on skills policy since Finegold and 
Soskice (1988) compared the ‘high skills’ regime in Germany to the ‘low-skills 
equilibrium’ in the UK. This does not mean that they regard policy change in this 
sphere as impossible; but that they regard such changes as enmeshed in broader 
networks of complementary institutions that sustain patterns of income distribution, 
welfare provision, legal systems and banking practices that are mutually sustaining at 
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national level (Hall and Soskice 2001). A historical institutionalist literature has also 
focused on the way these systems have emerged through contestation and negotiation, 
whilst retaining important continuities, providing important insights on how these may 
continue in the future (Thelen 2004; Conran and Thelen 2016). 
This paper therefore draws on these approaches to examine the potential for 
English post-16 education to achieve the transitions envisaged in recent policy 
documents. This analysis is not based solely on documentary analysis but is extended 
with reference to data collected during recent studies of contemporary policy change. 
Emerging apprenticeship practices and the workplace learning now being organised 
among full-time students are already providing interesting tests of the way current 
reforms are playing out in educational practice. This paper brings together data from 
these fields with the theoretical approaches introduced in the foregoing paragraph. The 
following section provides further background to current policy change and sets out the 
principal tensions behind contemporary policy. A further section sets out the theoretical 
basis of the paper, critically reviewing key institutionalist texts that have analysed skill 
formation. A description of how the empirical data has been collected and analysed 
follows, leading to conclusions about the future direction and outcomes of current 
reforms. The closing discussion summarises the threats inherent in contemporary 
change and briefly suggests possibilities for a more coherent approach to these 
dilemmas. 
Apprenticeship reform and technical education: policies and pathways 
Despite the bold tone of key policy statements, the main proposals of apprenticeship 
reform and of technical education are not visibly radical departures. Both include the 
shift of curriculum design and certification powers from the awarding bodies who 
currently approve qualifications to the IFA. However, the apprenticeship Trailblazer 
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Groups and the T-level panels include both education specialists and representation 
from interested employers: it is unclear how far this alone would change qualification 
design. Nevertheless, apprenticeship standards and their implementation have included 
three important distinctions from the earlier frameworks: the replacement of continuous 
assessment by end-point assessment (EPA); the shift from low-level awards, mainly at 
(lower secondary) level 2 to (upper secondary) level 3 and above; and the removal of 
qualifications from many lower-level awards. The key difference between the T-levels 
and the residual upper-secondary qualifications is the completion of a substantial work 
placement at the end of the course. These are different directions of travel but in some 
ways complementary: apprenticeships are apparently becoming more rigorous and more 
stratified; T-levels are moving upper-secondary education closer to the workplace. 
Yet both are discursively constructed as higher-quality routes that move the 
further education system closer to the labour market. Key policy documents express this 
differently. The Sainsbury Review draws heavily on references to the success of 
international systems more integrated with the labour market. The UK government’s 
Skills Plan (DBIS/DfE 2016), published on the same day, speaks a more direct language 
of employer control, reproaching colleges and awarding bodies who ‘have not provided 
an effective voice for business’ (11). Both approaches echo critique of a widening gap 
between the Further Education and Skills sector, particularly its publicly-funded 
colleges, and the workplace. Half a century ago these institutions mainly taught part-
time courses to full-time apprentices and were dominated by this technical and 
vocational provision (Esmond and Wood 2017; Cantor and Roberts 1972). Their 
missions expanded during the 1970s and 1980s to teach both wider numbers of A-level 
students and Access students, as well as disadvantaged young people and adults on 
lower-level programmes in England (Green and Lucas 1999). These highly diverse 
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institutions came to serve education policy objectives, contributing to the numbers of 
students achieving qualifications and to international league tables of educational 
success. More importantly, apprenticeship was substantially replaced by government-
led schemes as youth employment fell rapidly in the late 1970s and 1980s. This 
inevitably led to a weakening of the relationship between further education and the 
labour market, which was already tenuous because of the voluntarist nature of the 
system. In spite of government policies under all governments that emphasised a 
leading role for employers, few firms participated directly in the various bodies, such as 
sector skills councils, that governments established for these purposes. Keep (2007) 
identified a:  
… central paradox: that because of a laissez-faire attitude towards governmental 
responsibility for employer behaviour, the state has been forced to act as a 
substitute for employer effort (2007, p.161). 
Despite a rhetoric of market mechanisms and employer leadership, the latter remained 
absent from the mechanisms by which policy objectives in England were implemented, 
whether or not they approved of them. These criticisms applied particularly strongly to 
apprenticeships, which grew rapidly in response to government targets and incentives 
until a national levy instituted to coincide with the introduction of standards; but which 
even after the introduction of frameworks remained relatively weak qualifications with 
passive employer participation. Fuller and Unwin (2009) extended Keep’s argument 
about low employer involvement, arguing that the state was responsible for ‘the 
concentration of apprenticeship types at the restrictive end of the continuum’ (2009, p. 
412). These earlier discussions of employers and the absence of mechanisms for 
collective action are vital to any up-to-date assessment of the prospects for the UK 
government’s reforms. As will be seen, collective employer bodies and the role of the 
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state in certification play central roles in more work-based systems.  
By setting aside the discussion of earlier reforms and their limitations, 
policymakers and analysts risk failing to learn from earlier experiences. In this regard 
David Raffe (2011) distinguished the approach of ‘policy borrowing, in which “best 
practice” from abroad is identified and transferred back home’ and ‘policy learning’. 
Raffe used the latter to mean learning ‘from a country’s own policy history, or from 
more effective flows… between the contexts of policy and practice’ (2). Hodgson and 
Spours (2016) described the absence of any understanding of the past as a form of 
‘institutional amnesia’ closely linked to a movement for global reform of education, 
based in turn on ‘the imperatives of competitive globalisation as the only existing order’ 
(512). The rhetoric of technical education does make reference to alternative systems of 
skill formation in other countries: those engaged with the workplace, ranging from 
Germany’s ‘dual training’ system to its school-based imitators (Casey 2013, for 
example) are portrayed as having already achieved the policy objectives to which UK 
policymakers aspire. However, brief references to international systems with better 
links to the labour market address neither the mechanisms that exist in those countries 
nor the history of skills formation in the UK. We now turn to the explanations that 
political economists have offered of these systems. 
Institutions, policy actors and skills formation  
Political economists, concerned with broader patterns and choices of policy, may 
neglect the specifics of educational policy and practice; but their use of institutional 
theory makes two key contributions to discussion of skills policy reform. The first 
locates skill formation as an enduring institution, alongside others that contribute to the 
durability of national approaches to social and economic policy. The complementary 
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nature of these institutions produces effects that impede change, hindering the adoption 
of alternative approaches. The nature of institutions has been defined by Scott (1995) as 
comprising the regulative, normative and cognitive elements that provide stability and 
meaning to social life (56). Institutional theory does not readily accommodate change, 
explaining this in terms of some form of external shock or internal conflict, such as 
marginal actors challenging institutional norms (Leblebici et al. 1991). To define skill 
formation as an institution, given the durability of institutions and their resistance to 
change, is to draw attention to its continuities. Nevertheless, it is precisely accounts of 
conflict and change, emerging from the historical institutionalism literature, have 
provided the second key contribution to this discussion. 
Perhaps the most fundamental concept of political economy is that policy entails 
the possibility of choices. A key reason for these scholars’ interest in skills is that the 
collective arrangements, roles and expectations that support German dual training 
provide a refutation of supply-side economics and deregulation: the liberalised models 
of the US and UK, strengthened in the 1980s and purported to be the inevitable basis of 
liberalisation and policy convergence, were refuted by viable European alternatives not 
easily understood from outside (Streeck 1989). The ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature 
drew on a comparative institutionalism which regards skill formation as an institution, 
occupying a pivotal role amongst inter-connected institutions that determined a broad 
approach to economy and society: banking, welfare and employment policies meshed 
together to form coherent approaches that were more-or-less successful as national 
alternatives (Hall and Soskice 2001). Crouch, Finegold and Sako (1999) denoted skill 
formation as central to these mutually-reinforcing institutions. 
From an institutionalist perspective, the model of Anglo-Saxon ‘liberal market 
economies’ designated by Hall and Soskice (2001) is primarily dominated by the 
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economic utility of skills in the market economy. Since market relations dominate, the 
key concept for skills formation is that of ‘human capital’ (Becker 1964; Mincer 1974). 
In this regime, the fundamental problem identified by Becker was that of ‘poaching’: 
one employer is able to gain the benefits of the employee’s training by paying a 
marginally higher wage to the skilled worker whose training another employer has 
financed. This inevitably tends to discourage employer investment in training and 
suggests that the individual augmenting their worth through training should bear the 
main cost (for example by reduced wages during training). This Anglo-Saxon pattern of 
individual skills acquisition, through specific employment-based training following 
general education, may produce greater higher-end skills. It also results in greater 
inequalities, as there are fewer opportunities for workers with lower levels of 
educational achievement to access training (Lauder 2001). These notions of economic 
rationality may have achieved wider international currency under regimes of neo-
liberalism, but they remain most strongly entrenched in Anglo-Saxon societies (Hall 
and Soskice 2003). Here this ‘institution’ of skills formation coheres with shorter-term 
banking, welfare and policies which are focused on quick returns, as opposed to the 
more patient ‘corporate’ or ‘collectivist’ approaches of Germany and its neighbours.  
The economic arrangements that sustained collectivist models of skill formation 
have been described as providing ‘beneficial constraints’ on the economic calculations 
of agents in Germany, leading to high-quality production, high wages, long-term returns 
on investment and greater social equality (Streeck 1992). German dual training is more 
comprehensively embedded in the workplace than its neighbours’ school-based 
systemts; but Busemeyer and Trampusch (2012) have identified four features of skill 
formation systems held to be common to Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark and 
the Netherlands. Firstly, firms have a high involvement in providing skills, including 
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paying the costs of training. Secondly, employer associations and, in some cases, trade 
unions, work together in collective bodies. Thirdly, the system leads to the award of 
skills certification that is nationally recognised. Finally, skills training is located at firms 
as well as in schools (14-15). These arrangements combine arrangements among firms 
and labour market actors with the role of the state, leading Busemeyer and Trampusch 
(2012) to denote all these countries as ‘collectivist’, although they note important 
variations across the five national systems. Central to their analysis is their view of the 
relationship between collective action by firms and the state: 
… the extensive involvement of firms in the provision of initial vocational 
training depends on a particular combination of beneficial constraints and 
resources for collective action. In other words, maintaining the autonomy of 
firms to the largest extent possible does not contribute to the preservation of 
firm involvement in training because of the numerous collective action 
problems identified by labor market economists (16).  
Each country, then, is deemed to have resolved the ‘paradox of collective action’ 
(Crouch, Finegold and Sako 1999, 25), with employer associations playing the central 
role in pressuring their members to provide skills as part of the vocational system. 
Buseymeyer and Trampusch (2012) rationalised the use of the term ‘collective’ over 
such alternatives as ‘corporate’ or ‘dual’ systems on the grounds that skill formation is 
essentially a social process where firms, labour market associations representing 
employers and workers cooperate along with the state in the process of skill formation. 
This depicts a fragile balance between employer action and the state, which has 
important implications for the future of collectivist systems, with several important 
strains identified by European commentators. However, this brief analysis indicates the 
difficulties of other countries seeking to construct similar systems. In the event, only the 
fourth of these characteristics, the partial location of learning in the workplace, is visible 
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in emerging policies in England. As others have observed, the designation of the 
workplace as a locus for learning does not amount to an English version of dual training 
(Ryan, Gospel and Lewis 2007). This has implications for the UK government’s policy 
reforms and how matters might develop in the absence of collective bodies to sustain 
such a model. 
However, political economists also address the question how such arrangements 
arise. Thelen’s interest in the evolution of institutions led to her (2004) account of skills 
formation in Germany and Britain (with shorter discussions of Japan and the USA). In 
contrast to education-based accounts of policy decisions, Thelen (2004) identified the 
basis of modern arrangements in earlier conflicts among labour market actors. In 
Germany, Bismarck’s labour laws gave craft organisations power over training and 
certification, allocating the power to regulate and assess apprentices through the craft 
chambers. Large-scale employers sought to gain control of industrial training for their 
own systems, whilst smaller skill-intensive firms sought to engineer an industry-wide 
system based on skill standardisation and labour mobility. Trade unions in turn engaged 
in a struggle for a measure of control, achieved only when skill formation was 
converted into a paragon of social partnership after the 1969 Vocational Training Act. 
Yet its fundamental features remained intact throughout this period, surviving two 
world wars and a period of fascism that standardised workplace training, building an 
alternative to schools weakened by the dismissal of left-wing teachers (237-240). In 
Britain, the struggle over apprenticeship took a very different form, with employers 
seeking to dilute the workforce through cheap labour and the efforts of engineering 
unions directed not to controlling training but to resisting the influx of apprentices. Low 
wages, long training periods and the stratification of apprenticeships resulted in a much 
weaker and more fluctuating development up to and after the Second World War (142-
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7). Effectively, British apprenticeship remained largely subject to market mechanisms. 
Relatively weak collaborative developments and state interventions emerged after the 
Industrial Training Act (Ministry of Labour 1964) but their main form, Industry 
Training Boards, was supressed from the 1970s. 
This analysis has contributed to a sustained development of historical 
institutionalism, examining how institutions change over time. In addition to the 
analysis of historical processes, with long-term contests and negotiation over their 
content and form, writers in this field have begun to develop accounts of strategies for 
institutional change (Conran and Thelen 2016). Thus Thelen’s (2004) account of 
German skill formation is described as the ‘conversion’ of institutions, in which 
different actors assume the leading role over time, as the balance of power shifts, and 
others await their opportunities to strengthen their position. Several other possibilities 
are canvassed, of which the most interesting for our purposes is ‘layering’, where a 
further set of arrangements added, which in turn change the nature of the existing 
institution (Shickler 2001).  
Each of these two analyses is open to critique. The distinctions in the ‘varieties 
of capitalism’ literature, between ‘collectivist’ and ‘market’ systems, are in many senses 
idealised: they can neglect the diversity of provision even within Germany or Britain, to 
say nothing of the rest of Europe. The idealisation of the German system can neglect its 
many difficulties, which include firm-specific schemes whose learning is only 
recognised inside the organisation, identified as ‘segmentalism’ on Japanese lines 
(Thelen and Busemeyer 2008); these are linked to growing numbers of academic-route 
students accessing apprenticeships and the decline of opportunities for social groups 
that traditionally take this route (Kupfer 2010). 
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Similarly, accounts of an institution contested and negotiated among industry 
partners neglect the role of educational actors: Lassnigg (2015) preferred the notion of 
policymakers ‘muddling through’ (Lindblom 1959), with other social actors, such as 
educators, distorting or frustrating their intentions. The recent history of skills formation 
in England has also deviated from an unstoppable march towards a market model. 
Gospel and Edwards (2011) have compared the relatively slow dissolution of the 
corporate arrangements of the early post-war years during the 1980s, compared to the 
determined strategy with which Thatcherite ministers set about reshaping industrial 
relations. The Manpower Services Commission directly intervened in the labour market, 
albeit conforming to the government ethos of the time (Evans 1992).  
Nevertheless, it is argued that institutionalist approaches provide useful 
perspectives for understanding how collective skill formation can provide improved 
transitions to the labour market, whilst historical institutionalism provides important 
perspectives for understanding the prospects for policy change. In this paper they are 
used to assess the prospects for current reforms. The following section describes the 
methodological basis of the discussion presented here. 
Methodology 
In its broadest sense, the study described here constitutes what historical 
institutionalism terms a case study: a single case of how policy development and 
political conflict are shaped by institutional context. Institutions are not viewed as the 
sole cause of outcomes but they provide a useful concept to counter the simple notion of 
participation in labour markets. Moreover, they act as intermediate variables, structuring 
conflicts and mediating their outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). And, whilst many 
forms of institutionalism such as the well-known sociological neo-institutionalism of 
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DiMaggio and Powell (1983) focus on continuity, or the ‘non-plasticity’ of institutions, 
the focus here is on the way institutions change (Conran and Thelen 2016). By contrast 
to the identification of material interests in rational choice institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism has studied the way that ideas motivate actors at different times and in 
different settings, with a historical focus on how actors behave rather than a materialist 
focus on their interests. This suggests an emphasis on the long-term development of 
skill formation rather than identifying ‘critical junctures’ (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007) 
at which there are greater opportunities to make decisive choices. Methodologically, 
this implies the use of ‘qualitative and comparative methods to study how processes that 
unfold over long periods impact distributions of power and policy outcomes’ (Fioretos, 
Falleti and Sheingate 2016, 4).  
This study, unlike historical institutionalist case studies that present long-term 
developments a posteriori, examines unfolding policy changes and their practical 
outcomes for educational institutions and actors. It draws on a series of case studies, 
each of which examined the impact of policy changes on practice. The first of these 
studies examined the workplace learning of full-time students. A series of case studies 
of the work-based learning which level 3 students have undertaken during ‘study 
programmes’ following the Wolf Report (2011) was carried out in anticipation of the 
more substantial placements proposed by the Sainsbury Review (Esmond 2018). This 
study examined work-based learning in four vocational areas using case study methods, 
primarily documentary analysis, individual and group interviews. Data collection was 
carried out in both college and workplace settings, participants including students, 
teachers, work placement staff and representatives from the employment settings. Full 
details are given in the earlier publication (198-200). Further evidence of the shape and 
outcomes of work placements emerged when the author took part in the evaluation of 
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pilot placements organised during the 2017-18 academic year. These extensive 
qualitative studies covered 21 providers, each visited three times for interviews during 
the study with additional meetings and interactions organised in between the interviews. 
Samples varied across each case study, also based primarily on interview and 
documentary research; in this case, whilst students, curriculum staff and employer 
representatives were interviewed during the study, senior staff and work placement staff 
were interviewed most frequently. A substantial report of the study was published by 
the Department for Education (DfE) (Newton et al. 2018), although this is strongly 
focused on organisational approaches for providers organising future placements, rather 
than a critical evaluation of this experience. A study of apprenticeships in England was 
carried out initially through interviews of apprenticeship practitioners who are now 
expected to move beyond the traditional roles of ‘assessors’ (who in England and in 
other competency-based systems are expected to examine but not contribute to student 
learning) into more training-based roles (Esmond, in review).  
The first and third studies, led by the author, were guided by an ethical review 
process that examined in detail how to engage with participants in ways that would 
respect their rights and minimise any possibility for harm. Documents have not been 
attributed to authors or institutions; interview participants have been anonymised in all 
outputs. Interviews were tape-recorded, stored anonymously and transcribed in full. 
These and other processes were approved by a university ethics committee that follows 
the BERA code and other widely-recognised codes of practice. The same approaches to 
data collection were used in the second study, carried out on behalf of the DfE. 
However, not all interviews were transcribed: researchers wrote summary reports which 
were shared, supplemented by discussion among researchers. To conform to DfE 
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directions, none of the data collected in that study is quoted directly, protecting 
participant identities, albeit at a cost of missing valuable details. 
In data analysis, interview data and documents have been coded according to 
pre-designated categories relating to emerging arrangements for educational practice. 
For the purposes of this study, however, these categories have been reviewed and data 
re-examined in relation to historical institutionalist analyses of policy emergence. A key 
concern has been the extent to which data indicates institutionalist constraints shaping 
the choices of participants in emerging practices. An additional area of interest has been 
whether possibilities for change are evident in emerging arrangements around new 
forms of learning based in the workplace. This analysis includes a search for evidence 
of strategies for change discussed above, including conversion (Thelen 2004) and 
layering (Schickler 2001). Key findings of this analysis are set out below.  
Findings 
The first key theme through which to interrogate the data was whether recent policy 
changes were being supported by frameworks that provide access to labour market 
opportunities. From an institutionalist perspective, collective action by labour market 
bodies to provide and regulate training is an important requisite of success. In the case 
of these studies, this equates to the provision of work-based learning opportunities, 
whether placements on a technical education model or apprenticeships. This is not 
simply a matter of practically securing the target numbers of apprenticeships or T-level 
placements to meet government targets but of developing systems to provide 
appropriate training in widely-recognised skills. Financial incentives to employers and 
performative pressures on providers have served to increase the number of 
apprenticeship registrations until recently; but this remains a voluntarist system for 
which there is no collective industry pressure on individual firms. 
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The immediate outcomes of this system were seen to play out in the study of 
work-based learning opportunities available in colleges following the Wolf (2011) 
Review. Without any incentive or sanction from collective industry bodies, schools and 
colleges have been obliged to take the lead role in organising placements. In college-
based and workplace interviews and observations, significant differences emerged 
among the opportunities available to students. In traditional male occupational routes 
associated with high levels of technical skill and more theorised programmes, including 
engineering and professional construction, employers perceived a need to select a 
highly-skilled future workforce. Here employers seeking to avoid future skill shortages 
and to select the most capable students offered high-quality, well-organised placements. 
A professional construction employer described the development of selected technical 
specialists on the lines of US ‘career academies’: an employer body supporting students 
met regularly to discuss industry and curriculum developments, organising visits, 
mentoring experiences, placements and specialist projects. By contrast, the college 
placement co-ordinator explained that the need to provide opportunities for all students 
took more homogenised forms in relation to manual construction trades. Rather than 
hosting individual visits, employers would visit the college to give lectures on such 
topics as punctuality and attendance. As the college representative put it, ‘The numbers 
are huge… how much can we ask from employers?’ (Esmond 2018, p.202).  
Correspondingly, the nature of placements varied significantly across subject 
areas and the job roles for which students were being prepared. In the inquiry into 
‘study programme’ placements, childcare and education emerged as an area providing a 
significantly weaker learning experience, despite the long tradition of workplace 
learning in this field. Students complained of routine tasks through which they learnt 
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little; mentoring was unstructured; placements appeared to emphasise behavioural 
norms for the students:  
… getting them to put a uniform on, respect the uniform, no trainers, just the 
respectful side of things, and the wanting to be together and not be split up. The 
language as well: the terminology: ‘Oh, the kids…’ (nursery manager, Esmond 
2018, p.203) 
The focus on behavioural issues in this predominantly female, low-status vocational 
area and its contrast with the placements in professional construction, and to a lesser 
extent engineering, suggested a differentiation based on the status of occupations. This 
contrasts sharply with those systems where apprenticeship and other work-based 
programmes offer a substantial learning programme, including weekly school 
attendance, irrespective of the differences in the status of the occupations for which 
students are being prepared. One irony here is that the students receiving the most 
highly-developed learning programmes were those unlikely to leave college directly for 
the workforce but, like most professional construction students, were likely to progress 
to higher education programmes. 
Similar differences emerged during the early trials of work placements carried 
out for T-levels during 2017-18. In spite of its generally optimistic tone and emphasis 
on practical guidance, the final report refers to students who ‘felt frustrated if there were 
restrictions on the activities they could do, or if activities continued at low skill levels 
and became repetitive’ (Newton et al. 2018, p.14). Whilst safety and other regulatory 
constraints affected some placements, the routine nature of much placement work in 
some occupational fields echoed, on a larger scale, the routinised experience of some 
‘study programme’ students. Nearly a quarter of students in the trials did not complete 
their placement and the final report notes that ‘non-completion tended to focus on 
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learner dissatisfaction with placement content’ (15). The areas of difficulty appear to 
correspond to the status of occupational areas, with the highest drop-out rates in fields 
which included substantial amounts of routine work: agriculture, environment and 
animal care, along with education and childcare. By contrast, areas with more fulfilling 
work such as media, engineering and digital had low drop-out rates, even though it was 
difficult to find placements in some of these areas (101). Much of the report deals with 
how placements might be organised: a key issue is how they might be prepared and 
organised as learning experiences, rather than as routine activities to be endured with 
good behaviour. 
A useful explanation for these differences is the voluntarist nature of the system 
and the absence of genuine equivalents of the chambers or training agencies of 
collectivist systems. Thelen and Busemeyer (2008) argue that ‘collectivist systems 
typically train “above need” and rely on the participation of a wider range of firms’ (7). 
But on ‘study programmes’ and in the T-level pilot placements, providers were driven 
by the market mechanisms typical of skill formation in England. Lacking the means to 
compel placements, providers used educational charities to organise and monitor 
placements, providing the documentation through which providers could claim funding. 
Lacking industrial roots and detailed understanding of industry expectations, these 
charities were little able to provide opportunities for learning genuine industry skills. 
Significant numbers of students organised their own short placement through family or 
personal connections. Placements of this type inevitably reflect the objectives of some 
individual employers, directed less to the collective needs of industries than the 
selection of suitable future employees, or even the need for ‘an extra pair of hands’ at 
busy times. This experience was repeated on a larger scale during the 2017-18 pilots. A 
national charity was commissioned to design placement types but also provided support 
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to some of the providers, brokering placements with local employers. Despite links to 
national organisations, its representatives also lacked access to local networks, detailed 
industry knowledge, or any role in compelling participation by employers. The next 
round of ‘pilots’ during 2018-19 left the task of designing and organising placements to 
providers (DfE 2018). The difficulties of organising placements have contributed to the 
slow progress of T-levels, which have been scaled back to 55 providers in 2020, 
teaching three courses in digital, professional construction, and education and childcare. 
The scale of change envisaged for technical education appears to have diminished 
already from the wholescale replacement of existing vocational education to the 
addition of a partial alternative. 
The problems of T-level development which flow from this relate less to its 
practical difficulties than to its possible emergence as a more selective pathway than the 
remainder of vocational education. A differentiation between transitions into more 
highly-skilled, technical occupations and socialisation into service and care roles may 
emerge not from the intentions of policymakers and their advisers, but from the basis on 
which skill formation in England has come to rest, a voluntarist system in which 
employers playing a generally passive role in the absence of collective action. Thus, 
employers seek to meet their private needs for recruitment and selection; only providers 
seek to meet pressure to provide opportunities for wider layers of young people. 
The position of apprenticeships complements these developments. Young people 
on this route are already in employment, so are not dependent on negotiated placements. 
Yet apprenticeships also experience tensions between learning institutions and work. An 
empirical study of ‘assessors’, education-based staff employed by colleges and training 
providers to assess the progress of apprentices at work explored their move into training 
roles following the introduction of ‘standards’. Here the weak relationship between 
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education and the labour market emerged in the reports of difficulties practitioners 
faced in negotiating suitable environment for learning in the workplace. In the absence 
of generally agreed arrangements, or even a shared conception of what is entailed by a 
training environment, what might have been agreed in advance between education and 
industry bodies became a matter for individual negotiation. 
Yet these problems were mainly reported in service industries, in such areas as 
hairdressing and beauty therapy that mainly recruited young women at lower levels of 
study, in a further manifestation of hierarchical differentiation. With less theoretical 
content, these courses could be offered through workplace training more readily than 
technical occupations which required classroom-based study. In lower-paid sectors such 
as health and social care, employees were not always able to obtain time, nominally 
20% on apprenticeship standards away from work. In such industries as engineering and 
construction, both theoretical concepts and practical skills were taught in colleges, 
leaving apprenticeship staff to focus on behavioural expectations. A further gap in 
apprenticeships has emerged between higher levels with qualifications and lower levels 
where standards are entirely based on short summaries agreed by trailblazer groups. 
These differences were reflected in the difficulties reported for apprentices progressing 
from work-based programmes to college-based courses with a greater knowledge 
content and requiring academic literacy.  
These complementarities between the two cases, of technical education and 
apprenticeship, are indicative of the way educational practices are constrained by the 
institutional nature of skill formation. Conclusions to this generalised picture are 
discussed in the following and final section. 
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Conclusions 
The findings of the study do not suggest that work-based routes cannot be developed in 
English post-16 education, nor that these cannot contribute to young people’s 
transitions. What they do suggest is that, in the absence of labour market actors engaged 
in a negotiated process, is they will not provide opportunities to experience meaningful 
and fulfilling learning at work for substantial numbers of young people. The outcomes 
may contribute to some upskilling of industry and recruitment into technical roles but 
this appears increasingly likely to be confined to a fraction of the age cohort. Neither 
labour market actors nor the state, whose key role in certifying qualifications valid at 
industry level is central to collectivist systems, are actively engaged in developing 
collective approaches that would broaden the basis of skill formation. This rules out the 
kind of ‘continental selection’ suggested in policy discourses. The implication of the 
Sainsbury Review that existing forms of vocational education would be superseded by 
an all-embracing technical education appears to be rapidly eroding. 
  The immediate consequence appears to be that opportunities from workplace 
learning will be unevenly distributed, threatening a narrowing of the skill formation 
system, rather than the creation of new opportunities for the whole range of young 
people. This may seem a premature judgment, with apprenticeship standards only now 
emerging and technical education at the pilot stage. Yet in the absence of institutional 
constraints the emerging hierarchicalisation of apprenticeships is likely to be followed 
by a similar experience in technical education. The location of skills in a competitive 
market remains the principle of skill formation in England, with the lack of any contest 
among labour market actors enabling the dissolution of the collective arrangements that 
existed briefly during the post-war years. Political economists sometimes point to the 
dangers of ‘segmentalism’ for collective systems. Large firms in Japan, for example, 
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develop in-house training systems for their own needs to a high level but do not 
participate in a collective system; many German companies collaborate with 
universities to provide specialist programmes outside the collective system.  
However, institutionalism offers a further, bleaker possibility: the ‘layering’ of a 
new system onto the old, with the effect of altering the existing institution. Technical 
education and higher-level apprenticeships may become attractive opportunities for an 
elite of students and their partners, which draws in resources currently available to the 
broader vocational education system. Rather than a binary divide, the development of 
exclusive, elite routes would necessarily leave the remainder of vocational education 
further adrift from the body of (‘academic’ and ‘technical’) post-16 education. Its 
students, whose work experience would be limited to routine preparation for repetitive, 
low-skill tasks in service and care roles, would be further marginalised. This would be 
almost the polar opposite of systems that aim to create inclusive opportunities and 
generalised high levels of skill.  
Achieving such a system, then, is clearly a matter of more than organising work 
placements, in the hope that beneficial learning will result. Nor is it a matter of 
adjusting educational practice to the needs of competitive labour markets, which operate 
to the benefit of those groups already advantaged in educational settings. Workplaces 
are better able to support learning through suitable environments, planned activities and 
staff with training capabilities. Educational institutions and educators, currently 
expected mainly to meet targets and prepare students to behave during placements, will 
also play a more effective role if they engage directly with workplaces in the 
development of a more inclusive and equitable skill formation system. 
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